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ABSTRACT
Over 20 billion Internet of Things devices are set to come
online by 2020. Protecting such a large number of under-
powered, UI-less, network-connected devices will require
a new security paradigm. We argue that solutions depen-
dent on vendor cooperation such as secure coding and
platform changes are unlikely to provide adequate defenses
for the majority of devices. Similarly, regulation approaches
face a number implementation challenges which limit their
effectiveness. As part of the new paradigm, we propose
IDIoT, a network security policy enforcement framework for
IoT devices. IDIoT prevents widespread network attacks by
restricting IoT devices to only their necessary network be-
havior. IDIoT is simple and effective, building on decades of
tried-and-true network security principles without requiring
changes to the devices or cloud infrastructure.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2016, several high-profile websites (Github,
Twitter, Reddit, Netflix, and others) were taken offline by
a series of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
The DDoS attacks post-mortem revealed that the botnet
code (later dubbed Mirai ) was designed to discover and
compromise embedded devices using default credentials.
Further analysis estimated that 150,000 embedded devices
(digital video recorders and surveillance cameras) were
involved in the attack [27].
The Mirai attacks were noteworthy for two reasons: (1)
the attack volume (up to 1.5 Tbps) was one of the largest to
date, and was powerful enough to take down both a large
cloud service provider [7] and a major DNS provider [14],
resulting in Internet-wide outages. (2) The botnet provided
clear evidence that Internet of things (IoT) devices could
be leveraged as botnet clients, despite these embedded
devices not serving as general purpose computers.
Following Mirai, more IoT attacks were discovered. The
Vault 7 leaks [39] showed that state-level adversaries had
developed malware for smart TVs, which allowed them to
use the TV as covert spying devices. In April, the Brickerbot
malware was reportedly infecting IoT devices and perma-
nently disabling them. The malware infected devices via
telnet, and overwrote the content of storage devices with
random bytes [33].
The rise in IoT-specific attacks is perhaps unsurprising.
As the cost of adding wireless capabilities to devices de-
creases, more consumer electronics, toys, appliances, and
other “things” are becoming Internet-enabled. A 2015 re-
port [17] estimates that by 2020, there will be around 20
billion IoT devices online, with 65% of those existing in the
consumer space. IoT devices exhibit desirable character-
istics for attackers: they are powered-on and networked
24/7, they use weak security configurations, and they are
underpowered so they cannot run anti-malware, intrusion
detection, or auditing services. Software or firmware up-
date procedures for IoT devices tends to be clunky and
error-prone, allowing devices to remain unpatched for long
periods of time. Moreover, embedded devices often lack
displays, making it difficult to know whether the device is
behaving as expected at any given time.
This paper explores the new paradigm of securing 20
billion+ Internet of Things devices. We discuss challenges
and assumptions that complicate the deployment and use
of proposed solutions. We suggest, counter-intuitively, that
solving the IoT security problem may not necessarily re-
quire complex new hardware and software stacks. Instead,
returning to tried-and-true principles of network security
can be effective in securing devices. Our insight is that
unlike personal computers, IoT devices tend to behave pre-
dictably, and are thus well-suited for network isolation and
filtering techniques. Correct use of these techniques al-
lows even vulnerable devices to continue regular operation,
co-existing with other devices on the network.
We demonstrate these ideas through our implementation
of IDIoT, a network security policy enforcement architecture
for IoT devices. IDIoT filters the outgoing network connec-
tions of IoT devices, dropping those that are not required
for essential device operation. For example, surveillance
cameras should not be allowed to send traffic to Twitter or
Reddit, but should be allowed to upload video streams to a
cloud storage provider. These rules are encoded in a policy,
which is enforced close to the IoT devices.
Scope. Some definitions of IoT include industrial control
systems, smart-grid devices like smart meters, and vehic-
ular systems. In this paper, we focus on consumer IoT –
devices that an end user could purchase and connect to
their home network.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Surveys
Despite being relatively new, the IoT security research
space already has several surveys describing protocols,
architectures, design patterns, and research gaps. A 2010
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non-security focused survey [4] envisioned the IoT as a set
of devices that can communicate directly (without requir-
ing the Internet, but still requiring a local area network).
Under this many-to-many communication model, the sur-
vey highlighted challenges in network addressing, protocol
standardization, and security. However, the security issues
described do not appear to be IoT specific, focusing instead
on high-level issues such as authentication, data integrity,
and privacy.
In 2013, Roman et al. [34] compared the distributed IoT
paradigm to a centralized approach describing the differ-
ent security and privacy requirements of each model. The
paper noted that while a distributed IoT model encourages
privacy (data doesn’t have to be surrendered to a cloud
provider to obtain the desired functionality), deployment
challenges such as fault tolerance and interoperability re-
main unsolved. Interoperability is discussed in detail by
Keoh et al. [25] and Granjal et al. [18], who surveyed the
myriad of IETF-proposed standards describing protocols
for IoT communication at the physical (PHY), media (MAC),
routing, and application layers. Standardization efforts ap-
pear to be focusing on DTLS (TLS over UDP) as the secure
end-to-end transport layer, but there are still open questions
around strategies for provisioning or rotating key material,
how to deprecate old or add support for new cryptographic
primitives, and what key lengths are optimal given some
devices’ limited processing power.
2.2 Security Analysis of IoT Devices
This section reviews academic work focusing on the se-
curity analysis of embedded and IoT devices. We discuss
large-scale evaluations of multiple device types, followed by
research that focuses on specific devices such as Internet-
enabled locks, networked printers, and smart lighting.
Large-scale analysis. A 2010 study [10] scanned the IPv4
address space and found that 13% of devices (about 540,000)
that responded were vulnerable to compromise due to the
use of default credentials. While the highest ratio of vulner-
able devices was seen on ISP-issued modems/routers, the
scan also turned up IoT devices: DVRs, cameras, and VoIP
appliances. Cameras with default credentials were the cul-
prit in the recent Mirai botnet attack [6] which took down
major DNS resolvers. Pa et al. [32] developed a honeypot
to monitor botnets that target IoT devices. The analysis
revealed four botnet families targeting devices via telnet,
and after compromise using those devices to launch fur-
ther attacks. Default credentials and telnet remain active
forms of exploitation of IoT devices; in March 2017, security
firm Radware discovered the Brickerbot worm. Brickerbot
spreads via telnet and corrupts storage volumes on victim
devices [33].
Costin et al. [3] analyzed 32,000 embedded device firmware
images for printers, routers, cameras, etc. Without prior
knowledge of the firmware image layout or access to the
device for which the firmware was developed, the authors
were able to extract 35,000 RSA private keys, weak pass-
word hashes, and hardcoded credentials. The authors also
found a number of vendor-installed backdoors via the SSH
authorized_keys directive.
Heninger et al. [19] analyzed TLS certificates and SSH
host keys collected from Internet-wide scans. They found
vulnerabilities resulting from the use of default or well-
known private keys, duplicate keys due to insufficient en-
tropy during key generation, and were able to factor private
keys due to insufficient signature randomness or shared
common factors. While most of the vulnerable devices were
enterprise-grade network devices, they also found con-
sumer routers and VoIP products, and network-attached
storage devices had similar vulnerabilities. Heninger et al.
demonstrated that even the correct use of authentication
systems can become vulnerable if the underlying operating
system or hardware fails to provide sufficient entropy.
Smart Locks. The security of several IoT smart locks was
evaluated by Ho et al. [22]. The paper outlines the chal-
lenges in securing the smart lock architecture, which may
involve polling a cloud service to retrieve an updated list
of access control rules. While the findings and suggestions
in their work are specific to smart locks, some of the find-
ings are more broadly applicable to other IoT devices. For
example, the authors suggest eliminating reliance on cloud
services for critical functionality, since cloud interactions
may not always be available (e.g., server crash or the com-
pany goes out of business) and when available add latency
which decreases usability.
Printers. A survey on the security of network-connected
printers revealed the presence of decades-old vulnerabili-
ties in recent devices, as well as new vulnerabilities that
become possible by Internet-enabled printing [23]. The sur-
vey documents the challenges in securing devices that must
accept arbitrary code for their basic functionality, as well
as manufacturers’ unwillingness/inability to provide basic
levels of security.
Smart Light Bulbs. By exploiting a bug in the low-power
local area network protocol used by Philips smart lightbulbs
(Zigbee), Ronen et al. [35] were able to control victim light
bulbs from a distance. Moreover, Ronen et al. used a side-
channel attack to recover the AES key used by Philips to
authenticate and encrypt firmware updates, allowing them
to create and deploy malicious firmwares.
2.3 Network Isolation and Filtering
To prevent access of rogue devices onto their networks, en-
terprise network administrators have traditionally deployed
network access control (NAC) solutions. NAC allows access
to a wired or wireless network only if a client passes a set
of security tests pre-defined in a policy. The security tests
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can vary from simply proving ownership of valid credentials
(e.g., for accessing premium hotel Wi-Fi), to comprehensive
system inspections verifying the freshness of AV signatures,
the presence or absence of software packages, the versions
of specific packages, among others.
Comprehensive NAC solutions, where administrators pro-
vision the devices that are given to employees (e.g., laptops,
mobile phones), use client-side agents, which report sys-
tem status and integrity measurements. When installing an
agent is not possible, the NAC may use captive portals to
allow web-based authentication. Academic NAC proposals
have suggested using behavioral profiles instead of man-
ually defined policies to allow access to clients [15, 16].
However, these dynamic approaches may still incorrectly al-
low access to the network to devices that can fool classifier.
It appears existing NAC solutions aren’t well suited for
IoT devices since these devices cannot run agents, or au-
thenticate via captive portals. Additionally, the all-or-nothing
access to the network approach is too coarse grained, failing
to offer protection for devices that were previously autho-
rized to join the network, but later become compromised.
In recent years, a variety of integrated network security
solutions have emerged with the focus of protecting cor-
porate networks. Palo Alto Networks, Fortinet, Barracuda
Networks, and other companies now sell products marketed
as next-generation firewalls (NGFW) and unified threat
management (UTM) appliances. In addition to basic packet
filtering, these security products integrate network mon-
itoring, user/application awareness, intrusion prevention,
anti-virus, SSL interception, captive portals, spam detec-
tion, etc. These features, along with attractive UIs and
remote management capabilities, come at high premium; a
next-generation firewall can cost upwards of US$1000 and
require per-user licensing fees and support contracts. These
high costs are likely beyond acceptable for most households,
and the simplicity of many IoT devices makes NGFW and
UTM features overkill.
3 PROPOSALS FOR SECURING THE
INTERNET OF THINGS
This section broadly collects ideas and suggestions for se-
curing the Internet of Things. We do not aim to provide a
comprehensive list of all proposals to date, but rather we
aim to categorize, exemplify, and challenge representative
ideas found in the academic literature and news articles.
3.1 General Guidelines
3.1.1 Use of standard protocols. The idea here is that if
vendors make use of standard or well-understood protocols,
rather than custom solutions, they are less likely to create
insecure devices. Unfortunately the community has yet to
reach agreement on which of the dozens of standards to use
for each layer of the IoT stack [18]. Even if vendors agree on
a set of standards, these may still allow insecure operation.
For example the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
– specifically designed for IoT devices – allows a NoSec
parameter, which when used transmits data without using
authentication, encryption, or integrity protection. When
NoSec is used, these data protection mechanisms should
be implemented at the application layer.
3.1.2 Pen-testing/Code review for devices. While such
techniques are generally regarded as software development
best practice [28], pen-testing tends to focus on the iden-
tification of known vulnerabilities. Additionally, once the
honeymoon period1 ends, the time between the discovery
of subsequent vulnerabilities decreases.
Code review may help detect issues prior to release, but
this practice is not always effective, especially for small de-
velopment teams. Academic efforts exist to develop scalable
automated testing of IoT devices [36], but the challenges
introduced by hardware, software, and toolchain hetero-
geneity limit the chance of success of such one-size-fits-all
testing frameworks.
3.2 Technical Changes
While the security literature offers a rich set of secure pro-
gramming languages, architectural/platform security solu-
tions, and even verifiable operating systems (e.g., seL4 [26]),
these tools remain costly to deploy. The economic incentives
for IoT vendors to use and maintain such solutions, much
like in the case of secure desktop software [2], don’t appear
to exist. Given the rapid pace of innovation in IoT, it seems
to be more profitable to be first than to be secure.
In the hardware space, new architectures (e.g., San-
cus [24]) aim to provide a hardware-only trusted computing
base (TCB) for developing applications on embedded sys-
tems. While it is clear that such an architectures can offer
stronger security properties for embedded systems than off-
the-shelf platforms, it is less clear that such systems would
be used correctly if pervasively deployed. For example, San-
cus offers no mechanism for detecting or revoking compro-
mised cryptographic keys, forcing developers to come up
with their own solutions to these seemingly fundamental
issues.
To make matters worse, research on side-channel at-
tacks [11] has shown repeatedly that even when systems
are protected through correct use of cryptographic systems,
those protections can still be bypassed. While correct use
of cryptographic systems may force adversaries to higher-
cost attacks, it is becoming increasingly evident that no
assumptions can be made about the long-term security of
code, protocols, or devices.
1Clark et al. [8, 9] define the honeymoon period of software as the period
after a release during which no vulnerability has been found in a given
software product.
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In the network space, Yu et al. [40] proposed software-
defined networking (SDN) architecture to secure inter-IoT
device communication. The proposal, called IoTSec, adds a
virtual middlebox between each IoT device on the network
and the gateway. At each middlebox, a high-level policy
(i.e., defining allowed application-layer interactions rather
than packets or protocols) is installed, which defines a set
of allowed interactions between a protected device and
other devices on the network. IoTSec requires that home
networks be re-architected to support SDN, and that all
possible cross-device interactions be enumerated in order
to create the policies.
3.3 Regulation
From a non-technical standpoint, there has been an increas-
ing call to regulate the IoT space [37], citing market failures
as the primary reason for which IoT vendors will not inde-
pendently secure their products. While regulation appears
necessary, concrete examples of how regulation can help
IoT security remain to be seen. Moreover, regulation has a
number of challenges:
• What regulations are actionable by vendors? Requir-
ing more secure defaults is something that can be imple-
mented easily by vendors. However, weak default cre-
dentials and configurations are not the only source of
attacks. More complex vulnerabilities arising from buffer
overflows or weak entropy are difficult to solve prior to
release, as is known from the desktop software space.
• Who becomes the regulator? There are challenges in
selecting or forming a third-party verifier who can give a
security stamp of approval. This is particularly challeng-
ing and costly to enforce across borders. Additionally, lack
of consistency across verifiers (e.g., different definitions
of “secure”) can lead to confusion for consumers [31].
• How long are products regulated? With IoT devices
acting as simple switches, sensors, and toys, many of
these will outlive warranty and support periods with some
even outliving the company that produced them. It is
unclear if security regulation can be effective or enforced
beyond the support period, giving vendors incentive to
obsolete their products more rapidly.
• Compliance. As has been seen with regulation in other
domains (e.g,. PCI-DSS, HIPAA, automotive emissions),
imposing a set of minimum security standards often leads
to vendors complying with exactly those minimum stan-
dards, since every additional security feature or system
has additional cost. That additional cost will typically not
be recovered since security is not a differentiator in the
consumer space [2].
Distinct Distinct HC
Device Endpoints Domains IPs
AT&T Microcell 2 0 2
Fitbit Aria Digital Scale 2 1 0
Withings Smart scale† 2 1 0
Withings Baby Monitor† 2 1 0
PIX-STAR Photo-frame† 2 1 0
Belkin Wemo switch† 2 1 0
Blipcare BP meter† 2 1 0
Samsung Bluray Player 4 1 0
Netatmo Weather Station 5 1 0
LIFX Gen 1 bulbS 5 1 0
LIFX Gen 2 bulbS 5 2 0
Triby Speaker† 6 2 0
NEST Smoke Alarm† 6 4 0
TP-Link Smart plug† 7 2 0
Netatmo Welcome† 7 2 6
Amazon Fire TV 8 4 0
Amazon Kindle 9 8 1
TP-Link Cloud camera† 15 2 3
Amazon EchoS 20 13 0
AppleTV 4th Gen 37 23 2
Samsung Galaxy Tab†S 48 21 0
Android Phone† 57 48 0
Microsoft XBox One 74 57 0
Laptop† 140 101 0
Table 1: Network behavior of several IoT devices. Gen-
eral purpose computing systems given in the bottom
rows for comparison. HC IPs are hardcoded IP ad-
dresses, marked if no corresponding DNS lookup was
made prior to connecting to an IP address. Devices
with S ignored the DHCP-provided DNS resolver and
used Google’s resolver (8.8.8.8) instead. Data for de-
vices with † was obtained from the public dataset of
Sivanathan et al. [38].
4 THE IDIOT POLICY ENFORCEMENT
SYSTEM
Today’s consumer IoT devices do not behave like general
purpose computers. The lack of graphical or other inter-
faces on most IoT devices prevents users from directly
running their own software on the devices, even though the
underlying operating system may support it.
Table 1 lists a summary of the network behavior of 19
IoT devices. To populate this table, we monitored network
traffic of each device for approximately 12 minutes begin-
ning with device power-on. We avoided interacting with
device during the capture period, which gives us a baseline
of network activity done automatically by devices at boot
time. Our dataset was augmented with the public dataset
of Sivanathan et al. [38]. Our analysis shows that simple
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devices such as digital scales, smart light bulbs, and Bluray
players have a small network footprint. These devices look
up a small set of domain names (typically API endpoints
and domains used for network connectivity checks), and
only connect to the servers returned by the DNS lookups
of those domain names. By contrast, more complex devices
allowing installation of apps (e.g., laptops, mobile phones,
and game consoles) connect to a larger set of remote hosts
and perform more DNS lookups.
Current home networks treat IoT devices as general pur-
pose computing systems, allowing unrestricted network ac-
cess to the devices despite only requiring a small set of con-
nections to support their functionality. This over-privilege
creates an opportunity for attackers to use victim IoT de-
vices to launch other attacks (e.g., the Mirai DDoS attacks).
To mitigate this threat, we designed IDIoT, a network pol-
icy enforcement architecture for consumer IoT devices. The
goal of IDIoT is to restrict the network capabilities of IoT de-
vices to only what is essential for regular device operation.
For example, an Internet-connected surveillance camera
should be allowed to upload video feeds to a cloud service,
but should not be permitted to send arbitrary UDP traffic to
DNS resolvers. IDIoT policies allow the specification of net-
work activity that should be allowed, while any traffic not
specified in the policy is dropped at a policy enforcement
point.
4.1 Design Goals
Our design of IDIoT is informed by empirical observations
about current IoT devices and threats to those devices. We
additionally seek to achieve the following goals:
• Deployability. The system should provide security bene-
fits without requiring changes to either the IoT devices or
to the cloud services that that support them. Additionally,
the system should support standalone operation without
requiring vendor or third-party support (but could benefit
from such support, as explained later).
• Extensibility. With the growing applications of IoT, it is
unreasonable to expect a solution designed for today’s de-
vices will work for all future devices as well. The system
should support updates to policies and enforcement as
devices and technologies evolve. Moreover, updates pro-
viding support for new devices, new filtering techniques,
or new policies should not worsen existing protection to
devices.
• Simplicity. It is possible that heavyweight enterprise-
grade appliances (see Section 2.3) could offer similar lev-
els of protection. However, we expect most consumers to
lack interest, ability, and resources to deploy enterprise-
grade hardware in their households. The system should
build upon simple, yet effective, network filtering tech-
niques, and avoid unnecessary use of anomaly detection
or other techniques that could misclassify traffic.
Policies
(a) Enforcement at a smartphone
Policies
(b) Enforcement at a router
Figure 1: Overview of the policy enforcement archi-
tecture. (a) For IoT devices without direct connec-
tion to the local network (e.g., certain smart watches
and light bulbs), policies are enforced at the network
access device (e.g., a smartphone). (b) For IoT de-
vices with direct network connectivity, policies are en-
forced at the internet gateway (e.g., wireless access
point or border router).
4.2 Overview
To be effective at restricting network capabilities, the IDIoT
policy enforcement logic must be positioned at a vantage
point where all network traffic to and from IoT devices can
be inspected. Such vantage points will vary depending on
the wireless technology used by the IoT devices, and de-
pending on the topology of the network being instrumented.
As shown in Figure 1, devices using Zigbee, Bluetooth, and
similar short-range network technologies require a hub or
smartphone to provide connectivity to cloud services. For
these devices, policy enforcement can be built into the hub
if supported, or the hub itself may be treated as an Internet-
capable IoT device. For devices that support IP connectivity,
enforcement can be applied at the wireless access point,
WAN gateway, or at a middlebox between the wireless AP
and the gateway. We focus filtering on outgoing traffic as-
suming that most home gateways already filter unsolicited
inbound traffic (the default behavior when NAT is used).
IDIoT could easily be extended to filter inbound traffic as
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iptables,
ipfw, pf,
other firewall
HTTP Proxy
TLS Proxy
DNS Proxy
Other Proxy
* Allowed dst IPs
* Allowed proto/ports
* Allowed schedule
* Allowed throughput
…
* Allowed HTTP GET
* Allowed TLS cert
* Allowed DNS lookup
…
Network
Filtering
Application
Filtering
Per-device Network 
Security Policy
IoT 
Device Internet
(A)
(B)
Figure 2: Components of the IDIoT policy enforce-
ment architecture.
well, in situations where devices are globally reachable
(e.g., when using IPv6 with no border firewall).
Once an enforcement point has been selected, a policy
describing essential network behavior of the IoT device
must be obtained. Enumerating the network behavior that
is essential for regular operation of an IoT device can be
challenging. For example, should periodic reporting of de-
vice usage analytics be considered essential?, How do we
distinguish between user-generated network traffic and au-
tomated connections? For now, we assume the existence
of a policy for each device and in Section 4.3 we discuss
strategies for creating, retrieving, and adapting policies to
desired behavior.
IDIoT security policies aim to enforce the principle of
least privilege. That is, they should describe the minimal
set of allowable network connections. Policies are there-
fore whitelists; any connections that do not match at least
one entry in the policy will be dropped. Entries may spec-
ify connection metadata (e.g., packet sizes, traffic rates,
or schedules) or contents (e.g,. IP addresses, ports, pro-
tocols, flags). Policies may also specify application layer
contents for supported protocols. More details are given in
Section 4.3.
Depending on the type of entries, policies are loaded into
one of two filtering modules, as shown in Figure 2. Network
layer and metadata entries are loaded into the network
filtering module (A). This module converts entries into soft-
ware firewall rules suitable for use in one of the well-known
packet filtering frameworks on Linux, BSD, or other fire-
wall appliances. Application layer entries are loaded into
application-layer proxies, each implementing their own en-
forcement logic. Each proxy inspects payload data from
packets, and transparently forwards the request to the des-
tination if the request is compliant with the policy.
4.3 Policies
Listing 1: "Example policy for the Netatmo weather
station"
1 {"Netatmo Weather Station": {
2 "MACAddr": "70:ee:50:13:ab:cd",
3 "IPAddr": "172.16.1.2",
4 "AllowedDNSQueries": [
5 {"type": "A", "query": "netcom.netatmo.net",
"resolver": "192.168.1.1"}
6 ],
7 "AllowedDNSReplies": [
8 {"type": "A", "query": "netcom.netatmo.net",
"answers": "62.210.92.0/24"}
9 ],
10 "AllowedConnections": [
11 {"family": "IPv4", "dest": "netcom.netatmo.
net", "proto": "TCP", "dstport": "25050",
"freq": "6/hr"}
12 ]
13 }
14 }
IDIoT policies are machine-readable descriptions of ex-
pected network behavior for the IoT device. Policies are
whitelists, meaning that any outgoing traffic that is not
defined in the policy will be denied. We chose a whitelist-
ing approach instead of blacklisting for two reasons. First,
whitelisting, when describing a narrow set of behavior,
provides the strongest security guarantees; it forces an
adversary to operate within the confines of rules in the
whitelist, as opposed to operating around rules of a black-
list. Second, IoT vendors designing devices should be able
to describe how and to what the device needs to connect;
while IoT developers may not be security experts, they must
be aware of network activity since it is this very activity
that gives the device functionality. Because of the whitelist-
ing approach, device policies must ensure the inclusion of
rules for all expected connections including periodic API
calls, user-triggered network behavior, software/firmware
updates, etc.
Listing 1 shows an example policy for the Netatmo weather
station. Our analysis of network traces collected for the
weather station revealed that the device wakes up every
10 minutes, performs readings of CO2, temperature, air
quality, and air pressure, and uploads the measurements
to Netatmo’s cloud servers. To obtain the IP address(es)
of Netatmo’s servers, the device performs an IPv4 (type
A) DNS lookup of netcom.netatmo.net. The upload takes
6
Type Example Parameters
Metadata Schedule, rate, bandwidth, packet size
Contents Protocol, IP Address, port number, connec-
tion flags/state
Application Types of DNS lookups and responses, TLS
certificates, HTTP GET/POST/PUT request
Table 2: Example parameters that could be defined in
IDIoT policies
place over TCP on port 25050 to an IP address returned
by the previous DNS lookup. Line 11 in Listing 1 concisely
captures all the described behavior. It allows outgoing IPv4
TCP connections to port 25050 to any IP address returned
by a lookup to netcom.netatmo.net, with at most 6 of these
connections being initiated per hour (one every 10 minutes).
Line 8 restricts the IP addresses that are allowed as an-
swers when performing the DNS lookup, and Line 5 allows
lookups of only one domain name via a single resolver.
Note that the minimal policy in Figure 1 appears to be
sufficiently restrictive. However, even such a policy could
leave room for an attacker to be disruptive. For example,
an attacker gaining control of a IDIoT-protected Netatmo
weather station could flood the DNS resolver with a large
number of A lookups of netcom.netatmo.net, or send gi-
gabytes of TCP traffic to any of Netatmo’s servers. The
policy could be further tightened by specifying additional
restrictions such as number of bytes, packets, or number of
allowed lookups. Table 2 shows additional options that could
be defined in the policy. While the table is not meant to be
comprehensive, we note that adding a new parameter to
the policy only requires a corresponding way to inspect and
enforce that parameter at the enforcement point. Linux’s
netfilter framework includes many ways to filter traffic,
while new proxies can be written to support new applica-
tions and protocols.
4.3.1 Obtaining policies. We envision several ways to
obtain a policy for a given device.
(1) Manufacturer. The device manufacturer can create
the policies for devices they ship. We believe manu-
facturers are in the best position to do so, since they
also develop or commission the software for the de-
vice. It is thus reasonable to expect the manufacturers
to know what functionality the device needs. Policies
could be made available through vendor websites (e.g.,
a QR code on the box pointing to mysmarttoaster.io/
securitypolicy), or distributed along with the software
for managing the device.
(2) Third party. Policies can be written by third parties,
either by writing new policies from scratch after under-
standing the devices behavior, or by modifying manufacturer-
provided policies to be more/less restrictive (e.g., by
removing/adding rules). The IoT enthusiast community
has already enabled integration of vendor-unsupported
services and devices (e.g., Homebridge2, Home Assis-
tant3), so they may provide policies for certain devices.
Anti-malware and security firms could also provide poli-
cies as a service to their customers, creating an addi-
tional revenue stream.
(3) Automatic. If no policies are available from vendors or
other experts, it is possible to programatically create
policies by observing the network behavior of a device
for a given amount of time. The device can be assigned
a temporary allow all rule, during which all network
traffic is recorded. After the monitoring period ends, a
policy matching the observed behavior can be created
and enforced.
Once a policy has been retrieved and is being enforced,
functionality changes (e.g., through a firmware update) to
the IoT device may require updating the previously installed
policy. We expect IDIoT will require a mechanism to securely
authenticate and verify updated policies. One strategy is
to digitally sign policies and verify the validity of the signa-
ture against a set of pre-installed trust roots. Alternatively,
self-signed certificates along with a trust-on-first-use mech-
anism (à la Android [5]) could be used. We leave policy
verification and updates to future work.
4.3.2 Human aspects. An inevitable consequence of the
large number of IoT devices is that non-expert users will be-
come the administrators of dozens of devices. We see IDIoT
as a step toward improving transparency of devices, since
its machine readable policies can easily be converted to
human readable form and displayed on another device (e.g.,
smartphones or PCs). These policies could allow even non-
experts to gain visibility into what their devices are allowed
to do. For example, the entries max-bw-out: 10M/w and
valid-domains: api.lightbulbs.io can be converted to:
“This light bulb will not send more than 10 MB of data per
week to api.lightbulbs.io” or simpler “This light bulb will
only connect to api.lightbulbs.io”.
Another way to offer transparency and visibility is to
collect and display statistics at the policy enforcement point.
Measurements showing number of times a rule has been
matched, or displaying extraneous connections can help
identify devices that are misbehaving.
5 PROOF OF CONCEPT
As a proof of concept, we implemented a subset of IDIoT
functionality and applied the policy enforcement mechanism
to 3 devices: a Netatmo Weather station, a LIFX smart light
bulb, and a Fitbit Aria digital scale.
2https://github.com/nfarina/homebridge
3https://home-assistant.io
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Figure 3: Proof of concept IDIoT enforcement. IoT de-
vices connect to the IDIoT wireless network, while
other devices (laptops, phones) connect to the wifi
network. IDIoT policy enforcement happens at the
Raspberry Pi through iptables and dnsmasq.
5.1 Environment
We built a test environment on a Raspberry Pi Zero W run-
ning a recent build of Archlinux. The Raspberry Pi acts as
a middlebox between IoT devices and the network gate-
way by advertising a wireless network using hostapd4. A
USB-ethernet adapter connects the Raspberry Pi to another
router, as shown in Figure 3. This topology allows non-IoT
devices to connect to the “wifi” wireless network and ac-
cess the Internet in an unrestricted way. Devices on the
IDIoT wireless network are assigned IP addresses through
DHCP in the 172.16.1.0/24 network range, while devices
on the TP-Link router are on the 192.168.1.0/24 network.
Having separate networks and translating between them
via NAT offers the additional benefit of effortlessly prevent-
ing information leaks about, or rogue connections to the
unrestricted network.
Link layer isolation is done by setting ap_isolate=1 in
the hostapd configuration. This prevents wireless clients
from seeing each other at layer 2. Network layer rules are
enforced through iptables, Linux’s built-in packet filtering
framework. DNS filtering is done through dnsmasq [12], a
lightweight network infrastructure tool that supports DNS
forwarding.
5.2 Creating Policies
For each device, we created a policy using the automatic
method (see Section 4.3.1) and manually inspected the poli-
cies for correctness. To automatically create the policies,
we developed a tool in golang that reads network packet
captures (in the form of pcap files) and produces a JSON
policy as shown in Listing 1. The tool reads in packets from
4https://w1.fi/hostapd/
the capture file, identifying new or ongoing TCP/UDP ses-
sions. The tool also inspects DNS traffic, recording queries
and replies.
For the weather station and the light bulb, we captured
network traffic for 12 minutes. Both devices performed
some background activity. The digital scale only performs
network activity for uploading measurements. Thus, we
stepped on the scale twice and recorded network activity.
Once the packet capture has been read, the tool removes
duplicate entries (e.g., recurring DNS queries or TCP con-
nections) and produces a policy object. The object can then
be printed to the screen, or written to a file in JSON or other
formats.
5.3 Enforcement
We wrote a simple tool that takes as input a policy file
(see above) and converts entries in the file into iptables
rules or dnsmasq whitelist entries. For example Listing 1 is
converted to:
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i wlan0 \\
-s 172.16.1.2 -d 62.210.92.0/24 -p tcp \\
--dport 25050 -m limit --limit 6/hour -j ACCEPT
#iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i wlan0 \\
-s 172.16.1.2 -d 192.168.1.1 -p udp \\
--dport 53 -j ACCEPT
Note that our tool combines multiple policy entries (in
this case lines 7 and 11) to create a stricter iptables rule.
Since the connections entry specifies a destination host-
name, and there is a corresponding rule specifying allowed
IPs for that hostname, the rule can precisely specify al-
lowed sources (-s) and destinations (-d). The second rule
allows UDP traffic to destination port 53 as required for
DNS lookups. The firewall is configured to drop all traffic
that doesn’t match at least one rule, and to allow replies to
connections that were allowed outbound.
We configured dnsmasq to forward received DNS queries
that are allowed by the policy. To do this, the dnsmasq con-
figuration file requires the no-resolv directive, which in-
structs the resolver to ignore the system’s DNS resolvers,
and therefore not do any DNS forwardings unless otherwise
specified by a whitelisted entry. These whitelisted entries
are extracted from the JSON policies by looking for the
“AllowedLookups” directive. Allowed lookups are added to
the dnsmasq configuration file as:
server=/netcom.netatmo.net/8.8.8.8
The entry above instructs dnsmasq to forward all queries
of netcom.netatmo.net to Google’s public DNS resolver
(8.8.8.8). Finally all other lookups (using the wildcard “#”)
are set to return an address of 127.0.0.1.
address=/#/127.0.0.1
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5.4 Testing
After deploying the enforcement rules, we attempted to
use the IoT devices to ensure their functionality was not
impaired by our filtering. The Fitbit Aria successfully up-
loaded weights. The Netatmo weather station was able to
perform periodic reporting every 10 minutes, but repeated
on-demand readings (triggered by pressing a button on top
of the device) made the number of connections exceed the
6/hour threshold. A more permissive value of 10-20 per
hour may be more appropriate to allow a small number of
on-demand readings.
The LIFX bulb worked as expected, although with higher
latency between commands and responses. The LIFX bulb
can be controlled through a smartphone application, which
is expected to be on the same local network as the bulb.
By having the bulb and smartphone and different networks,
commands were sent to LIFX’s cloud servers, which were
then read by the bulb’s long-lived TCP connection to the
same servers. While this added latency, it had no effect on
functionality.
6 DISCUSSION
This section discusses technical challenges in deploying net-
work filtering solutions to secure IoT devices, and outlines
non-networking issues in the IoT security domain.
6.1 Technical Challenges for IDIoT and
IDIoT-like Solutions
6.1.1 Device-to-device connectivity. Certain IoT devices
require discovery and connectivity to other devices on the
network. In particular, devices that don’t rely on cloud ser-
vices may operate by discovering nearby devices and inter-
act with them directly. While disabling access point isolation
may enable certain use cases, it also opens up the all de-
vices on the wireless network to attacks. There may be
opportunities for “selective AP isolation”, where devices
can be allowed to communicate with authorized specific
devices on the same network.
6.1.2 Device Identification. Current IP networks identify
devices based on layer 2 identifiers (MAC addresses) and IP
addresses. When creating or loading a policy that applies
to a given device, it is still possible for a compromised de-
vice to modify its behavior, and simultaneously modify its
identifiers. Miettinen et al. [29] show that fingerprinting
device types can be done with high accuracy, but identi-
fying distinct firmware builds or hardware variants of the
same device is more challenging. Being unable to identify a
device correctly could allow a device to spoof the behavior
of a different device with a less restrictive policy. While
better fingerprinting techniques are developed, an alterna-
tive solution to this problem is remote attestation, but this
requires a trusted hardware module.
6.1.3 Complex IoT devices. Throughout the paper, we’ve
described how our proposed policy enforcement framework
can be effective when devices have a small set of predictable
functionality. Given the rapid pace of innovation in IoT, it
is reasonable to expect IoT devices to grow in complexity.
As devices gain features that allow customization or exten-
sibility, our ability to profile and restrict them drops. This
is already the case for IoT-ish devices like the Xbox or the
AppleTV (see Table 1). These multimedia boxes allow the
installation of applications, blurring the line between single-
purpose functionality and general purpose computers. Be-
cause each new application may require connecting to a
variety of cloud services, enumerating all possible servers
and protocols may become infeasible. Personal desktop fire-
walls experienced usability challenges for this very reason
over a decade ago; repeated prompts to allow network con-
nectivity for each new application were often dealt with
allowing all outbound connections [21].
6.1.4 WAN-enabled IoT devices. As wireless technology
costs decrease, manufacturers may start shipping products
with built-in WAN connectivity. Direct WAN connectivity
increases usability by removing the need for complex net-
work attachment procedures, and also gives vendors di-
rect access to the device for diagnostics and updates. The
downside of direct WAN connectivity is of course the con-
sumer’s inability to control the communication channel. IoT
devices with such capabilities already exist; for example,
the Amazon Kindle can download books and updates over
its built-in 3G connection. Another emerging technology is
LoRaWAN [1], a low-power wireless protocol which allows
devices to effortlessly join city-wide networks.
6.2 Beyond IDIoT
We’ve described IDIoT as a possible solution to the IoT se-
curity problem. We’ve shown that IDIoT can be effective in
restricting what compromised devices do on the network,
which protects both internal and external hosts from attack.
However, network-based attacks are not the only threat to
IoT devices and users.
6.2.1 Data Privacy. Data produced by IoT devices can be
stored on cloud servers for facilitating interaction with other
services or for displaying to users through web interfaces.
Network filtering techniques can only ensure that the data
is sent to the expected endpoints, but cannot enforce what
the data is used for by the cloud provider. While promising
approaches for preserving data privacy exist (e.g., differen-
tial privacy [13] and homomorphic encryption [30], these
approaches have yet to see broad adoption.
6.2.2 Device/Service longevity. Certain classes of IoT
devices have long expected lifespans. For example, LIFX
advertises that their bulbs should last around 22 years if
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used 3 hours per day. It may be unreasonable to expect com-
panies to provide security updates to devices for such long
periods, but long device lifespans pose a number of (some-
times non-technical) challenges. What happens with user
data and devices if the company is acquired or files for bank-
ruptcy? What happens if domain names for API endpoints
or IP address space move to a new owner? IoT vendors
must consider these cases and design their infrastructure
accordingly. If the decision is to plan the obsolescence of
devices (c.f. Revolv [20]), users should be informed.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper discusses the challenges in securing billions
of consumer IoT devices. We argue that security solutions
requiring vendor involvement, such as modifications to hard-
ware and software are unlikely to be successful. We propose
IDIoT, a network-based isolation and filtering system for IoT
devices. Our proof-of-concept showed that Mirai-style at-
tacks can be prevented without any modifications to devices.
The design of IDIoT demonstrates that there are simple prob-
lems buried within a complicated paradigm, and these can
be solved effectively without over-engineered solutions. We
argue that additional straightforward solutions are needed
to help secure IoT devices in years to come.
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